In December 2024, two events —drone sightings in the US and Israel’s strike on Syria’s weapon depots— were followed by orchestrated reports of detected radiation spikes. Some media outlets took these dubious reports (with millions of views) that originated from social media , and published pieces based on them. In one of these cases, the actors behind the disinformation campaign exploited a real-time radiation map, which is maintained by a private company that manufactures personal dosimeters, to sustain the narrative.
Kim Zetter has recently published "Anatomy of a Nuclear Scare", an article that covers this issue.
This trend does not come as a surprise, as radioactivity is one of those few things that can collectively trigger significant levels of societal anxiety and emotional, rather than rational, response, which is often disproportionate to the actual physical risks it poses. This radiation fear has been shaped during years by a mix of cultural, historical, and media-driven narratives.
In recent years, increasing geopolitical instability, the ever-growing influence of social media, the return of magical thinking and the precariousness and discrediting of traditional sources of information have resulted in a constant flow of misinformation.. It’s no coincidence that successful campaigns can be executed with limited resources, compared to traditional manipulation activities, and still have the potential to go viral, maximizing ROI.
Despite the fact that these campaigns explicitly exploited—or leveraged—publicly available online resources providing real-time radiation levels, in most cases, the actions were simplistic and carried out without the need for specialized ‘cyber’ skills or expertise. So far, the only exception to this trend can be found in Chernobyl’s post-invasion radiation spikes from 2022.
I see no reason to believe that we won’t likely see similar campaigns in the near future. I also acknowledge that this topic is not everyone’s cup of tea. You may not have the time or interest to go through detailed technical explanations of radioactivity from both physics and cybersecurity perspectives. However, for those who are really interested in that kind of in-depth reading, I’ve published comprehensive research papers on this topic.
So, I thought it might be useful to put together this publication, which is merely intended to serve as an ‘emergency guide’ to quickly grasp a set of simple yet sound principles that hopefully can help everyone, regardless of their background, to approach radioactivity-related reports with a critical eye. Armed with these fundamentals of radiation monitoring, we'll learn how to quickly discern between stories that make sense and those that don't hold water.
An Emergency Guide to Understanding Radioactivity and Radiation Monitoring
Let’s say that you want to build a simple cabin in a small plot of land you have in the woods. The foundations should be stable enough to ensure the structure does not collapse just right after finishing it. However, you have an unusual constraint: the only material you can use is balloons. Common sense suggests that, although balloons are not the ideal material, the best way to use them would be to keep them completely deflated. Anything built using inflated balloons will not last long; it depends on the quality of the material the balloon is made of, but everybody acknowledges that sooner or later that structure will end up deflated.
At a microscopic level we find a similar pattern, let’s just replace balloons with atoms—though the situation is pretty much the same. Many different types of atoms (isotopes) are unstable because they are ‘inflated’ with energy. These unstable isotopes, instead of losing air, will gradually decay into a more stable configuration by releasing this excess energy in the form of 4 main types of ionizing radiation (but not necessarily all of them): alpha, beta, gamma rays and neutrons. The time required for half of a statistically significant set of isotopes to decay is known as the half-life. (T1/2).
This property of unstable isotopes to emit radiation when decaying is what we know as radioactivity.
Eventually, by the time the
decay chain is completed, which may take from just a few minutes to hundreds of years or even so much time that we can de-facto consider that isotope as stable (depending on the half-life), these now ‘deflated’ isotopes would have transmuted into some of the
251 stable nuclides which, together with electrons, are making form to everything we see in our daily life, including ourselves.
Radiation emitted by these unstable isotopes has a fundamental property: it carries enough energy to knock electrons off atoms of the matter it interacts with (creating ions, indirectly in the case of neutrons as their interactions with electrons are negligible), thereby altering their chemical properties. This is called Ionizing radiation. If that ‘matter’ turns out to be human tissue, the biological damage inflicted to cells and genetic material can cause serious health issues, such as cancer.
However, ionization and penetration capabilities are not necessarily equal. For instance, alpha particles have a high ionization ability, but these particles will be unable to pass through a piece of paper. Depending on the composition and density of the materials, neutrons and gamma rays could also be 'blocked’, or at least see their energy significantly attenuated.
The key concept to keep in mind is that ionizing radiation interacts with matter, and as a result of these interactions it can be blocked or significantly contained. As we will see later on, this property is vital to properly assess any scenario where ionizing radiation is involved.
While we are being constantly bombarded by cosmic rays that yield an ‘acceptable’ background level of ionizing radiation, what we are really concerned about is anthropogenic sources. We can identify 4 different types:
1. Radioactive sources
Ionizing radiation can be beneficial when properly applied to different sectors, such as industrial, medicine or agriculture. This requires the use of 'radioactive sources’, which are sealed devices that contain a specific quantity of a radioactive isotope. It is fairly common for these radioactive sources to get lost (and then found) during delivery or stolen by people who do not really understand the implications of what they’re doing. These situations are usually accompanied by the authorities emitting public warnings. Fortunately, in the vast majority of cases, the radioactive sources are eventually recovered.
2. Activated items
Certain non-radioactive materials can become radioactive when irradiated by neutrons. These activated items can then inadvertently become part of a supply chain. A relatively ‘common’ scenario involves activated items found in metal scrap processing facilities.
3. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Accidents
So far neither of these scenarios is part, fortunately, of our daily routine. However, we all know the potential implications of such situations.
In turn, we can divide these 4 types into 2 groups (local and global), depending on how widespread the impact could be in case something goes really wrong.
Local
In this group we would have Radioactive sources and Activated items. As we have seen, certain types of ionizing radiation (alpha particles) are blocked with just a piece of paper. In urban areas there are multiple elements that would ‘naturally’ contain emissions from these elements.
We should bear in mind that even in the worst case scenario of unsealed radioactive sources or contaminated metal scrap, a direct exposure will be narrowed down to a very specific localized area, in close proximity to the radioactive source.
Global
Let’s imagine that we have had a significant, ground-level, nuclear event at a point A. The important principle to consider in this kind of scenario is that the radioactivity that will be detected at a distant point B is not directly coming from the ionizing radiation emitted by the radioactive nuclides (radionuclides from now on) at Point A, but as a result of their long-distance transport.
As we have seen, depending on the type of ionizing radiation it will interact with matter differently. Therefore, even for Gamma rays and neutrons, it would not be easy to travel hundreds of kilometers without finding either artificial or natural obstacles (i.e geography) that can block them. On top of this we must also consider other physical laws and properties such as the inverse square law (the intensity of the radiation is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the source) or the fact that free neutrons (those that are not bounded to an atom) are extremely unstable, having a half-life of just 10 minutes.
Getting back to the balloon analogy, at point B we would not be detecting the gamma rays emitted by a balloon at point A. Instead, some of those balloons would eventually reach point B, directly influenced by the weather conditions, and only then would their ionizing radiation be detected in the B area.
The interaction between radionuclides and nearby matter yields aerosols. These aerosols, essentially airborne radionuclides forming a plume, will then be transported and deposited along the way according to the weather conditions, and their physical properties such as weight or aerodynamics.
There are nation-wide radiation monitoring networks in almost every country. These are usually maintained by the corresponding government agency or organization to ensure public safety and continuous monitoring of ionizing radiation levels. However, from a dosimetry perspective, ‘ionizing radiation levels’ may be open to many interpretations, so to properly assess the extent of the exposure of a human body to ionizing radiation, the International Commission of Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) defines three different quantities: Physical, Protection and Operational.
In this context, the Ambient Dose Equivalent Rate (H*), is an operational quantity for area monitoring that represents the potential biological impact on human tissue from exposure to external radiation field, whose main contributor would be gamma rays. Public radiation levels provided by governmental radiation monitoring networks typically correspond to this quantity, which is measured in (micro)sieverts per hour (μSv/h).
The devices used to calculate this quantity are known as area monitors.
They are basically comprised of the following elements:
Radiation Detector
Radiation detectors generate an electrical signal (i.e pulse) whenever gamma rays are detected, in order to ‘count’ them. There are different technologies to achieve this, such as Scintillators or Geiger-Muller Tubes. Although they work differently, the underlying idea is to amplify the interaction of the impinging high-energy photons (gamma rays) with a medium (e.g., inert gas) in order to generate an electric signal that can be later on processed by the electronics.
Electronics
The electrical signals generated by the detector are analyzed and processed by digital logic, resulting in the calculation of the required quantity. In really simple terms, to get the final value the ‘counts’ (pulses) received over a determined time period (e.g.,Counts-Per -Minute, CPM) are multiplied by a calibration constant, which is specific for each detector.
These readings are then cyclically transmitted, usually via a custom Radio-Frequency protocol to a central server where they will be collected, processed and eventually disseminated to the official real-time radiation maps publicly available on the Internet.
A second kind of device is commonly present in these high-end networks: aerosol monitors
These monitoring stations contain specific filters and pumps designed to capture the aerosols that contain the radionuclides. These filters are periodically collected (usually on a weekly basis) and then sent to a laboratory for a detailed analysis. Although, in certain cases, radiation monitoring networks are equipped with automatic air sampling stations that can perform these analyses autonomously.
As opposed to area monitors, aerosol analysis includes the identification of the radionuclides via spectrometry. Therefore, the results obtained from aerosol monitoring stations are commonly broken down by radionuclide (i.e Caesium-137, Iodine-131…) and expressed in Bq/m3 .
We’ve learned the fundamentals of radiation monitoring and are now ready to apply them to real-world scenarios. Before doing so, let’s review a series of simple steps we can use to spot red flags in media coverage of radioactivity-related events.
Five questions that a serious article should clearly answer
1. Who is the source of the radiation reports?
For instance, if a random verified Twitter account reports radiation spikes in a backyard due to secret nuclear weapons that reptilians are stockpiling in California, I’d be cautious.
On the other hand, if several European countries report that they are detecting an increase in the concentration of a specific radionuclide in the atmosphere, then you can legitimately start asking questions.
This is precisely what happened in Europe in
2017, when mysteriously the airborne concentration of an artificial radionuclide, Ruthenium-106, went off. France’s IRSN
tracked down these radiation spikes to a radioactive leak coming from a Russian nuclear fuel reprocessing facility in the Urals: Mayak Nuclear Complex. Later on a group of more than 70 scientists fleshed out the details in a joint
paper, concluding that the radioactive plume originated in that complex “possibly for the production of a high-specific activity 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment in Italy.”. In the meantime, Russia denied this, instead pointing to a radioactive battery that exploded during the reentry of a satellite—an event that, for some reason, went undetected by everyone else.
An official report is not something we should blindly believe; it's important to understand the context—e.g., Ukraine reporting radiation spikes after the Chernobyl invasion. If something seems off, it's time to triangulate the reports to determine if there’s something else going on.
2. What is the quantity that the reported radiation levels correspond to?
In order to properly characterize a radiological incident, the article should clearly indicate the quantity of the reported radiation spikes. Official reports from scientific bodies will always mention the quantity (Activity, Exposure, Dose equivalent, Contamination…) and their corresponding units (Bequerels, Coulombs/kg, Sieverts, Bequerels/m2 …).
3. How long did the radiation spikes last?
The shorter the period, the less concerned we should be. When area monitors are involved, radiation spikes lasting from seconds to less than a few hours can be usually explained by natural phenomena or glitches in the electronics. For instance:
- Thunderstorms are ionizing events which can be linked to transient spikes.
- Extremely low temperatures may increase the density of the gas inside Geiger-Müller tubes, potentially triggering short-lived radiation spikes. The same temperatures can also adversely impact the batteries, resulting in potential glitches.
4. How widespread are the radiation spikes?
The wider the area, the more concerned we should be. A radioactive plume coming from a nuclear accident will progressively hit different areas, following patterns that can be forecasted by using dispersion models. Therefore, official reports from different countries and/or regions, would clearly indicate something is going on.
Unverified radiation spikes near nuclear facilities should also be carefully reviewed before getting alarmed. Confirmation bias plays a significant role here and can, of course, be maliciously exploited.
This happened in
2016 when RT and social media accounts from the Russian orbit reported that a radiation spike detected in Tri-City originated from leaks in Hanford nuclear facility. Later on, the EPA explained this was instead caused by a thermal inversion, which temporarily prevented radon from dispersing in the atmosphere, generating localized radiation spikes.
5.What are the technologies involved?
The ‘Cyber’ component as the root cause for reported radiation spikes cannot be excluded. But again, we shouldn’t push for it; hype and confirmation bias are the things to avoid here.
It is important to clarify which technologies are involved, how data is transmitted, and whether the radiation readings are verified before being made public. Also, the detector technology is important to assess the possibility of radiation spikes.
For instance, if the detector uses Geiger-Müller tubes capable of detecting alpha and/or (hard) beta particles in addition to gamma rays, this increases susceptibility to electromagnetic interference.
After carefully analyzing all other options, if things still don’t add up, it will then be time to consider whether a cyber scenario played a role. This was how I approached the Chernobyl
research.
We must also remember that the scientific bodies responsible for maintaining nationwide radiation monitoring networks could be targeted in order to publish misleading or false radiation levels. For instance, in 2021, an incident for which there is not much information... “OIG identified several instances of unknown third-party threat actors accessing EPA-furnished computers.”
Real-world cases
#1 - Drones and radiation spikes.
The well-known British tabloid, published the following in the “Science & Tech” section.
The article is a succession of unverified claims and conspiracy theories where everyone quoted is trying to leverage the allegedly detected radiation spikes for amplifying their own narratives. The headline does not even question the veracity of the radiation spikes, essentially a textbook clickbait.
According to the previous steps, the red flags are blatant:
1. Unofficial, unverified sources
2. Lack of sound characterization of the spikes
3. Unspecified, transient or ‘single-shot’ radiation spikes
4. Localized spikes, no one else detecting them.
5. Amateurish technology, plausible cyber scenario
The source of those radiation spikes was the ‘
Geiger Counter World Map’, an amateurish ‘real-time’ radiation map maintained by GQ Electronics, a company that manufactures personal dosimeters. The website exclusively relies on the influx of unverified data coming from GQElectronics’ customers to show radiation levels, in the form of raw ‘Counts-Per-Minute’ (CPM) and/or dose rate (μSv/h).
The security posture of the site is basically inexistent, as anyone can register and start sending arbitrary readings. On top of that, a quick analysis of the software and website reveals that basically you just need two IDs (AccountID and GeigerID) to post radiation levels to the website, and both values seem to be publicly available on their own map, so potentially anyone could impersonate an arbitrary station to upload false radiation readings.
It’s important to clarify that the website itself is not malicious, but it was exploited by the instigators of the disinformation campaign, as multiple people pointed out on their forums. Since then, they have added the following disclaimer:
“Disclaimer: This is citizen's science site and follow no verification of measurements. Please refer to the EPA's Radnet or other Government sources for any further actions”.
#2 Israel, Syria and nuclear bombs.
This case is interesting because it highlights the danger of confirmation bias and the partial or misleading interpretation of legitimate sources.
The 24th of December, India.com published the following
story
Let’s follow the 5-questions approach.
1. In this case, the person (an untrusted source) who initially interpreted the spikes relied on trusted sources, such as the European Union’s Radioactive Environmental Monitoring. However, he used a partial and misleading interpretation of the readings. On the other hand, official entities in Europe didn’t issue a warning, which raises a clear red flag about the credibility of this theory.
2. The spikes were properly characterized, because they were coming from a trusted source that specifies their origins. However, a partial and misleading interpretation of trusted information is still possible.
3. The spikes were short-lived, lasting less than an hour. This wouldn't match the fallout of a nuclear bomb. However, one could still find it intriguing that the spikes were detected on the same day (December 16th) that Israel struck a relatively nearby weapons depot.
4. The spikes were detected by official entities all over Cyprus, which, without the proper analysis, could plausibly add some credibility to the theory.
5. The technology involved is not an immediate concern, as it’s a government radiation monitoring network with professional detectors. There are also no signs of foul play or hacking.
So, what’s going on?
I was analyzing the spikes to find a proper explanation, which becomes evident when we
correlate precipitation levels with gamma levels over the course of a week, rather than focusing solely on the day of the strike.
As we can see, the short-lived radiation spikes, including those on the day of the bombing, are clearly influenced by rain periods over Cyprus. This is not surprising, as it is well-known that the Ambient Dose Equivalent Rate increases during precipitation intervals, causing transient radiation spikes. Based on what we have learned, we can easily understand why.
Essentially, the water droplets will bring down airborne radionuclides present in the atmosphere. Therefore, those aerosols that were out of reach of the area monitors due to their height (remember the inverse square law) will now be closer to the detectors, slightly increasing the gamma levels and causing the spikes.
Fine, you may say, but why are there radioactive aerosols over Cyprus in the first place? In general terms, the atmosphere contains a residual amount of radionuclides from historical nuclear weapons testing and Chernobyl, but radon is usually the most plausible explanation.
As in many other countries, Cyprus has radon. This radioactive gas escapes from cracks in the soil and disperses into the atmosphere. However, precipitation can hinder this dispersion. As part of the radon decay chain, two radionuclides are primarily gamma emitters: Lead-214 (with a half-life of 28.6 minutes) and Bismuth-214 (with a half-life of 19.7 minutes), which can contribute to the slight increases in gamma rays detected at ground level.
So, no Israel
did not use a nuclear bomb in Syria.
Conclusions
Radioactivity is invisible for the human eye. Therefore, we necessarily rely on instruments, devices and various types of equipment to assess the impact of an incident involving potential releases of radioactive materials. The main problem, as in many other sectors, is that this information can be
spoofed, thus drawing a picture of the scenario of an ongoing event that does not correspond to the actual physical conditions. As a result, it is possible to launch a disinformation campaign that mixes facts, half-truths, and outright lies.
“Some time later, on a Wednesday evening, during a particularly cold winter, a massive power cut progressively spreads across Winternia. After the first few hours of confusion, media outlets and social networks begin to be flooded with reports and rumors about an unspecified, ongoing situation at the NeutronMode-IV NPP. These messages are a mix of easily verifiable facts (NeutronMode-IV has been effectively disconnected from Winternia’s national grid) and dubious reports about automatic radiation monitoring systems across the country detecting radiation. spikes. Panic ensues.“
Based on what we have seen it seems likely that malicious actors will try to exploit fear of radiation to amplify or position their narratives, to the detriment of more plausible explanations. These kinds of campaigns can systematically parasitize legitimate or regular events to turn them into a cause for societal anxiety or other specific objectives.
Education, transparency, and critical thinking will be essential tools for countering these scenarios. However, we must not overlook the technological aspect of this problem, which involves ensuring the security of radiation monitoring networks as well as the integrity, authenticity and traceability of radiation readings.
